Copyright Law\u27s Theory of the Consumer by Liu, Joseph P
Boston College Law Review
Volume 44
Issue 2 Symposium: Intellectual Property. E-
Commerce And The Internet
Article 5
3-1-2003
Copyright Law's Theory of the Consumer
Joseph P. Liu
joseph.liu@bc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please
contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law's Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C.L. Rev. 397 (2003), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol44/iss2/
5
COPYRIGHT LAW'S THEORY OF THE
CONSUMER
jOSEPH P. Ltu*
Abstract: Copyright law has a rather well-developed theory of the
author, but it has no similarly well-developed conception of the
consumer. This exploratory Article is an attempt to begin piecing
together a coherent image of the copyright consumer. The author
argues that copyright law currently conceives of consumers in one of
two ways, either as passive consumers of copyrighted works or as active
authors in their own right. This binary conception of the consumer,
however, is incomplete, as it neglects important and complex consumer
interests in autonomy, communication, and creative self-expression. By
examining these additional interests, it is possible to begin constructing
a richer and more complex image of the copyright consumer. This
image, in turn, can help shed light on some of the current debates over
the proper shape and scope of copyright law.
INTRODUCTION
Copyright law has a rather well-developed theory of the author.
The author of a copyrighted work is an individual who is motivated to
create primarily by the hope or anticipation of economic gain. This
individual writes, paints, or composes, thinking of the potential eco-
nomic reward for the fruits of her labor. Without such a reward, the
prospective author would write, paint, or compose far less, if at all,
U.S. copyright law responds to this conception of the author by pro-
viding economic incentives to engage in creative activity. By harness-
ing the economic self-interest of the author, society benefits from the
creation of new creative works. This is the dominant. image of the
author that underlies U.S. copyright law. It is reflected in both the
Copyright 2003 by Joseph P. Liu, Assistant Professor, Boston College Law School.
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son, Mitch Singer, Alfred Yen, and participants at the Boston College Faculty Colloquium
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shape of the Copyright Act as well as the underlying constitutional
grant.'
At the same time, this dominant image of the author has been
modified and critiqued in recent years. U.S. copyright law now recog-
nizes, to a limited extent, that certain authors may have non-
economic interests in their creations as well. Thus, the law now pro-
tects, for certain types of works, an author's right to attribution and to
the integrity of those works. 2 At the same time, the image of the ro-
mantic, single author has come under powerful criticism from com-
mentators who argue that it is sharply at odds with the reality of mod-
ern, collective, and corporate authorship of complex works such as
software, movies, and sound recordings. 3 Others have leveled a post-
modern critique of this image of romantic authorship, questioning
the manner in which copyright law privileges certain creators over
others. 4 The net result of both the dominant theory and its subse-
quent critiques is a relatively well-developed (though not uncontro-
versial) theory or set of theories about authors of copyrighted works.
Surprisingly, far less attention has been paid to consumers of
copyrighted works. To be sure, the interests of consumers of copy-
righted works are represented throughout the Copyright Act. 5 After
all, the overall purpose of the Copyright Act is not to reward authors
for the authors' sake, but to reward authors to benefit consumers and
society more generally.6 Copyright doctrines are thus shaped to keep
this ultimate goal in mind.? Yet, despite this recognition of a general
consumer interest, rather little has been written about the precise
U.S. CoNs•r. art. I, § 8, cI. 8; Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2000).
2 See Visual Artists Rights Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106A.
3 See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUC-
TION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 132-43 (1996); MARK Rost:, AUTHORS AND OWNERS:
THE INVENTION or COPYRIGHT, at Viii (1993); Peter Jaszi, ON the Author Effect: Contemporary
Copyright and Collective Creativity, 10 CARnozo ARTS & ENT. LJ. 293, 302, 319-20 (1992);
Peter jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of "Authorship," 1991 Dula: L.J.
455, 460; Martha Woodmansee, On the Author Effect: Recovering Collectivity, 10 CARDozo
ARm & ENT. L.J. 279, 288-92 (1992).
4 See, e.g., Margaret Chon, NeW Wine Bursting from Old Bottles: Collaborative Internet Art.
Joint Works, and Entrepreneurship, 75 Ott. L. REV. 257, 263-66 (1996); David Lange, At Play in
the Fields of the Word: Copyright and the Construction of Authorship in the Post•Literate Arillennium,
55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1992, at 139, 142-43.
5 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-112.
6 See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985) ("The
monopoly created by copyright thus rewards the individual author in order to benefit the
public.") (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 477 (1984)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
7 See id.
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shape and scope of this interest. The Copyright Act itself scarcely
mentions consumers—indeed, it contains no consistent generic term
to refer to those who consume copyrighted works 8—and the literature
has generally followed sttit.. 8 What precisely are the interests of con-
sumers of copyrighted works? Are consumers motivated primarily by
economic considerations, such as price, quality, and variety? Do they
view copyrighted works primarily as consumable commodities? Or is
their relationship to copyrighted works more complicated? Until now,
these questions have largely been unaddressed, at. least in a compre-
hensive manner.
This exploratory Article is an attempt to begin piecing together a
more coherent picture of the copyright consumer. The main point. I
wish to make is that consumer interests are quite a bit. more complex
than we ordinarily think. I will argue that, as currently structured,
copyright doctrine and commentary contain two primary conceptions
of the copyright consumer: the consumer as passive consumer and
the consumer as author in his or her own right. Many existing copy-
right doctrines and much existing commentary funnel copyright. con-
sumers into one of these two categories." Yet, as I hope to show be-
low, consumers also have important and complex interests in
autonomy, communication, and creative self-expression." Existing
copyright doctrines provide some indirect recognition of these inter-
ests as well." Although recognition of these interests is not express,
8 The Copyright Act mentions "authors" and "copyright owners" many times, but con-
tains no corresponding generic term to denote those who consume copyrighted works.
The Act refers to these people variously as: "persons," see, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition
of "publication"); "the public," see, e.g., id. (definition of "publicly"); "owner" of a copy; scc,
e.g.. id. §§ 109,117; the "transmission recipient," see, e.g., id. § 114 (d) (2) (C) (v); the "sub-
scriber," sea e.g., id. § 119(d) (8); and 'consumer," see. e.g., id. § 1008.
9 But sect,. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW
OF USERS' RIGHTS 191-218 (1991) (detailing the rights copyright users enjoy). For a dis-
cussion of copyright law from a consumer's perspective, see generally Jane C. Ginsburg.
Can copyright Become User-Friendly, 25 CoLum.-VLA.I.L. & Ain 's 71 (2001) (reviewing JESSICA
LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (2001), which argues that copyright is now too complex and
counterintuitive for users); Michael Landau, Has the Digital Millenium Copyright Act Really
Created a New Exclusive Right of Access?: Attempting to Reach a Balance Between Users and Content
Providers' Rights, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SLIC'Y U.S.A. 277 (2001) (detailing flaws in the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 ("DMC.A") from the user perspective); Deborah Ttissey,
From Fan Sites to Filesharing: Personal Use in Cyberspace, 35 GA. L. REV. 1129 (2001) (exploring
unauthorized uses of intellectual property in cyberspace and proposing adoption of a lim-
ited personal use privilege).
See infra notes 18-51 and accompanying text.
II See infra Parts 1.C.1-3.
12 Sec infra notes 43-80 and accompanying text.
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these interests are important because they affect the extent to which
consumers can derive full value and meaning from the copyrighted
works they consume. 13
Beyond initial recognition of the greater complexity of consumer
interests, I also wish to begin exploring how this more complex image
of the consumer [night help shape our analysis of copyright law. In
this Article, I will suggest that, in structuring copyright law for the
digital environment, we need to be sensitive to the potential effects on
these interests. It may well be, as some have suggested, that some of
these interests will be satisfied by normal market mechanisms." That
is, if consumers truly hold these interests, it is possible that the market
will eventually serve them, We need to be sensitive, however, to the
possibility that the market, for a variety of reasons, may not fully serve
these interests, or may not serve them in ways that we like. This con-
clusion suggests that certain legislative developments, which tend to
assume that the market will address these interests, may be ill-advised.
Two caveats are warranted here. First, about the use of the label
"consumer": as mentioned above, copyright law and commentary con-
tain no universally accepted generic term for those who access, .pur-
chase, and use—i.e., "consume"—copyrighted works. 15 I am con-
sciously choosing the term "consumer," rather than a more neutral
term like "user," "the public," or "audience," in part because I wish to
focus on those uses that are literally consumptive rather than produc-
tive in nature, and the term roughly captures this distinction.I 6 I am
also using this term, however, because it has been used in some of the
copyright literature and public debate to describe copyright users
more generally and has a certain passive connotation.i 7 One aim of
this Article is to challenge this connotation and expand the concep-
IS See infm notes 43-80 and accompanying text.
14 See infra Part 1.1.A.4 (discussing market responses).
15 See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
16 Sec PATTERSON, supra note 9, at 191; Vochai Benkler, Front Consumers to Users: Shifting
the Deeper Structures of Regulation Thwart! Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. Coml.
L.J. 561, 562 (2000) ("'technology now makes possible the attainment of decentralization
and democratization by enabling small groups of constituents to become risers . . ."); Jane
Ginsburg. Authors and Users in Copyright, 451. CoevRIcarr Soc'• U.S.A. I, 4 (1997) (in this
lecture, I will elaborate on what I perceive to be the causes of the current user Eights chal-
lenge to copyright.") (emphasis added); Ruth Okediji, Givers. Takers. and Other Kinds of
Users: A Fair Use Doctrine for Cyberspace, 53 FLA. L. REV. 107. 112 (2001) ("In this Article. I
argue that the underpinnings of the fair use doctrine ... have ... utility in facilitating ...
taxonomy for determining the rights of providers and 11503 of content in cyberspace.")
(emphasis added).
17 See generally Benkler, supra note 16.
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lion of the consumer to reflect accurately what copyright consumers
actually do with their copyrighted works. 18 That is, I will argue that
those thought of as everyday consumers of copyrighted works in fact
have a more complex relationship to copyrighted works than com-
monly recognized.
Second, this Article is exploratory and its conclusions are tenta-
tive. The general point I wish to make is that copyright law currently
does not have any persuasive or coherent theory of the consumer, and
that examining consumer interests in more detail may shed some use-
ful light on a number of existing copyright law debates. Beyond this
basic point, I attempt to sketch out what a more fully developed the-
ory of the consumer might look like and how such a theory might af-
fect our thinking about the proper scope of copyright law. I do not,
however, purport to lay out the definitive theory of the consumer. It
may well be that this particular theory of the consumer is not persua-
sive, or that other, more compelling theories exist. I do hope, how-
ever, that by at least focusing more attention on consumers of copy-
righted works, this Article will suggest to others that a useful
alternative structure exists for examining some of the debates cur-
rently circulating in the copyright field.
I. CONCEPTIONS OF THE CONSUMER
In this part of the Article, I attempt to sketch out different. con-
ceptions of the copyright consumer. I will argue that copyright law
contains at least two primary conceptions of the consumer: the con-
sumer as passive consumer and the consumer as author. I will then
argue that these two conceptions are incomplete, and that there exist
additional consumer interests in autonomy, communication, and
creative self-expression. I will group these interests under a general
conception of the consumer as an active consumer. I will also show
how existing copyright law doctrines currently provide some indirect
recognition of these interests, and how changes in technology are
forcing us to confront these interests more expressly,
18 I recognize that, in seeking to expand upon this term, there is a risk that these con-
notations are so strong and so entrenched that they will in fact.undercut the broader point
I hope to make.
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A. The Consumer as Passive Consumer
One image of the copyright consumer is as a passive consumer of
copyrighted works as entertainment commodities. Call this the "couch
potato" view. Under this view, the copyright consumer is really no dif-
ferent. from the consumer of any other good. The consumer is pri-
marily interested in getting access to a wide variety of copyrighted
works at reasonable cost. The consumer then consumes these works
in a largely passive manner. That is, the consumer reads the book,
watches the movie, listens to the CD, and does little more. Consuming
books or movies is thus little different from consuming potato chips,
bottled water, athletic shoes, or any other consumer product.
This image of the consumer should be familiar, as it largely
reflects the reality of our existing mass-mediated markets for copy-
righted works. 19 The copyright industries in the United States gener-
ate billions of dollars in revenue, much of which derives from the
consumer market. 2° Books, movies, music, television, and much soft-
ware are produced and marketed for consumers just like other con-
sumer commodities. Advertising dollars are spent attempting to con-
vince consumers to purchase one set of copyrighted works over
another. Focus groups are conducted to discern consumer prefer-
ences. Consumers respond by purchasing products that they like, and
they proceed to consume these works in a largely passive manner.
Copyright law responds to this image of the consumer primarily
by ensuring that conditions exist for a functioning market in copy-
righted works, i.e., by making sure there are works for them to con-
stime. 21 It does this by solving the basic public goods problem, i.e., by
giving entitlements to authors, so that authors will have adequate in-
centives to produce consumable works, and then permitting the mar-
ket to direct investment so as to satisfy, consumer preferences. 22 Rights
against unauthorized reproduction, public distribution, and public
performance thus permit producers to exploit these copyright mar-
19 See Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and Amish Children: Autonomy. Information, and Law, 76
N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 92-98 (2001) (discussing how mass media markets limit content diver-
sity on television).
" See. e.g., CRAIG JOYCE ET Al.., Comucurr LAW 2 (5th ed. 2001) (stating that core
copyright industries accounted for 4.3% of the 1997 U.S. Gross Domestic Product, or
$348.4 billion).
11 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
22 See, e.g., id.
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kets without fear that initial investments will be undercut... 23 Once the
law sets entitlements, competition among goods will serve consumer
interests in passive consumption.24 Beyond ensuring that such goods
are produced, copyright law does not need to concern itself with con-
sumer interests, because they are, under this view, rather minimal. 28
Note that under this view, the ability of consumers to engage in
fair use or more productive uses of copyrighted works is not a major
consideration. 2° Under this view consumers see copyrighted works as
conunodities, so few consumers will in fact engage in any active trans-
formation or adaptation of copyrighted works. Rather, the vast major-
ity of consumers will consume such works passively. To the extent that
some consumers wish to do more, these are treated as exceptional
cases and may be accommodated under the fair use doctrine. 27 The
fair use defense, however, should he narrow in scope, because if it is
too broad, it may begin to undercut the stronger passive consumer
interest in having materials to consume. 28 Indeed, if too broad, the
doctrine may also undercut attempts by the market to respond prop-
erly by licensing some of these uses. 29
This image of the consumer as a passive consumer is consistent
with some of the thinking behind recent legislative initiatives. For ex-
ample, the legislative history of the recently enacted Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act of 1998 ("DMCA") contains repeated references
to "consumers," and the statute itself is aimed, quite consciously, at
making sure that the necessary conditions exist for copyright owners
to securely provide consumers with access to copyrighted works." The
22 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000) (detailing copyright owners' exclusive rights in their
copyrighted works).
24 see. g Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
25 See. e.g., id.
26 See id.
27 See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
28 sec, e.g.. Tom Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use The Impact of Automated Rights Management on
Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV. 557, 58111.110 (1998).
29 See, e.g., id. at 581-84; I. Trotter Hardy, Contracts. copyright and Preemption in a Digital
World, 1 RICH. J.L. & Thum. 2, 1 7 (1995). available at http://law.richmoncieduijolt/
vlil/hardy.html. A broad fair use doctrine may also undercut a general consumer interest
in ensuring that cultural properties have fixed, stable meanings. See Justin Hughes, "Re-
coding" Intellectual Property and Overlooked Audience Interests, 77 TEx. L. REV. 923, 955-63
(1999).
3° See 17 U	 §§ 1201-1205; H.R. REP. No. 105-551(11), at 21 (1998), 1998 WL
414916 ("Today, the information technology industry is developing versatile and robust
products to enhance the lives of individuals throughout the world, and our telecommuni-
cations industry is developing new means of distributing information to these consumers
in every part of the globe."); S. ltrP. No. 105-190, at 2 (1998), 1998 WL 239623 ("1TJ his
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vision of the consumer in the legislative history is not much different
from the consumer of any ordinary consumer good. 3i The primary
concern is making sure that consumer preferences for entertainment
commodities are satisfied. Comparatively less attention is paid to en-
suring that consumers can actively rework or transform copyrighted
works. Indeed, many provisions of the DNICA seem designed to pre-
vent just this kind of activity. 32
This image of the consumer also underlies some of the related
copyright literature that supports a "fared use" or "pay per use" model
of distribution.33
 A number of commentators have argued that, as
copyrighted works are increasingly distributed over the Internet,
authors should be given greater assistance in their attempts to con-
trol, and charge for, individual uses of copyrighted works. 34
 Under
this view, technology will eventually permit so-called "trusted systems"
to impose "micro-charges" for access to copyrighted works. 35
 Thus,
instead of selling copies to consumers, their use of copyrighted works
will be metered. 36
 The benefit of this setup is that authors will be able
to maximize their return from copyrighted works, while still providing
access to all consumers who are interested in such access. 37 This view
reflects, to some extent, the view of the consumer as a passive con-
sumer of works as entertainment commodities. 38
bill ... creates the legal platform for launching the global digital online marketplace for
copyrighted works."); see also WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INFORMA-
TION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 11IE NATIONAL INFOR-
MATION INFRASTRUCTURE 177-97 (Sept. 1995), available at http://www.tisisto.gov/web/of-
fices/com/doc/ipnii
 [hereinafter WORKING GROUP].
3' See S. REP. No. 105.190, at 2, 1998 WL 239623.
32 Notably, the DMA lacks any broad fair use defense, and instead substitutes a num-
ber of specific, narrower exemptions. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205.
33 See, e.g., Bell, supra note 28, at 564-67; Hardy, supra note 29, II 19-21; see aisojlane
Ginsburg, Copyright Use and Excuse on the Internet, 24 CoLum.-VLA J.1„ & ARTS 1, 45 (2000).
34
 Sec Bell, supra note 28, at 564-67; Hardy, supra note 29, ¶1 19-21.
See, e.g., Bell, sttpra note 28, at 564-67; Hardy, supra note 29, 11 19-21, 46,
36 See, e.g., Bell, supra note 28, at 564-67; Hardy, supra note 29, 11 19-21, 46.
37 See, e.g., Bell, supra note 28, at 585-90; Hardy, supra note 29,11 19-21, 46.
38 cf. Bell, supra note 28, at 564-67; Hardy, supra note 29,13 19-21, 46. True, more
active modes of consumption might be permissible under this licensing scheme as well.
That is, if consumers wish to do more than simply access the work briefly, then these uses
might also be served by the market, through micro-charges. The primary focus of this view,
however, is satisfying consumer interests, which are assumed to be largely passive.
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B. The Consumer as Author
An alternate view of the copyright consumer, one that sits at the
opposite end of the spectrum from the passive consumer view, is of
the consumer as author. Although it may seem a bit odd to think of
the author as a consumer, in fact the Copyright Act recognizes that.
authors often consume earlier works in the process of creating their
own works." Indeed, no work is truly and entirely new." All works
build upon earlier works to some extent, 41 Thus, in some sense, every
author is also a consumer of earlier copyrighted works, again in the
literal sense of that term. 42
The tradeoff between earlier authors and later authors is ex-
pressly acknowledged in various copyright doctrines, such as the
idea/expression doctrine, 43 the derivative-work right, 44 and the fair
use doctrine.45 Thus, later authors can take ideas, concepts, and
themes from earlier works, and build upon them to create new
works. 46 They can also engage in limited copying of the expression of
prior works, to the extent such copying is permitted under the fair use
doctrine. 47 At the same time, the derivative-work right limits the ability
of subsequent authors to build too closely upon expressive elements
from earlier works. 48 If subsequent authors wish to build upon these
expressive elements, they must license this right from the original
author.49
This relationship between earlier authors and later authors has
been amply explored in the copyright literature, and my purpose here
is not to recap that literature, but simply to observe that later authors
are also consumers of copyrighted works." Thus, this alternative int-
39 See info notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
49 See, e.g., Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. Come-
R /MIT Soc'Y U.S.A. 209, 218 (1983) ("The central problem is that all works are to some
extent based on works that precede them,"); Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 Emottv
LJ, 965, 966 (1990) ("But the very act of authorship in any medium is more akin to trans-
lation and recombination than it is to creating Aphrodite from the foam of the sea.").
41 See. e.g., Goldstein, supra note 40, at 218; Litman, supra note 40, at 966.
42 See Goldstein, supra note 40, at 218; Litman, supra note 40, at 966.
43 See, e.g., Baker y. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 101-02 (1879).
44 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
46 Id. § 107.
46
 See id. §§ 106-107; Baker.101 U.S. at 101-02.
42 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106-107; Baker; 101 U.S. at 101-02.
48 See 17 U.S.C. § 106.
49 See id.
611 See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 40, at 218; William Landes & Richard Posner, An Eco-
nomic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL Situ. 325, 333 (1989) ("[Elvery author is both
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age of the copyright consumer can serve to anchor the opposite end
of the spectrum from the passive consumer view. Instead of merely
consuming a book or a movie in a passive manner, the consumer as
author consumes a book or a movie to create new works. The copy-
righted work is raw material that serves as the basis for future crea-
tion. Moreover, this consumer's engagement with the work is ex-
tremely active. The later author reshapes, adopts, reforms, and recasts
elements of earlier works to create new ones. 51 This type of consumer,
the consumer as author, already has a privileged place within copy-
right law doctrine.
C. The Consumer as Active Consumer
These two images of the consumer of copyrighted works, how-
ever, do not exhaust all of the possibilities. In fact, there exist, be-
tween these two polar extremes, a number of other consumer inter-
ests that are not as widely recognized, but that play an important role
in setting the balance of rights between producers and consumers.
These interests include interests in autonomy, communication, and
creative self-expression. I group these interests under the image of the
consumer as an active consumer of copyrighted works, one who does
more with copyrighted works than simply passively consume them.
Recognition of this more active image of the consumer can be found
in some existing copyright doctrines.
1. Autonomy
Consumers have an interest in some degree of autonomy in their
consuniption of copyrighted works. Autonomy, in this sense, means
freedom in choosing when, how, and tinder what circumstances to
consume a copyrighted work. Consider, for example, the way one
commonly reads a book. Rarely do you read it in a single setting, from
front to back. Instead, you pick it up, read portions, put it clown, and
return to it later. Perhaps you reread sections, going back over earlier
portions. Maybe you underline it and write comments in the margin.
After you finish it, you might go back and read it again. Or consider
an earlier author from whom a later author might want to borrow material and the later
author himself."); Mark Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75
Tux. L. REV. 989, 997, 1005-28 (1997) (discussing patent and copyright law's treatment of
"improvers" of previously patented or copyrighted works).
51 See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 40, at 218; Landes & Posner, supra note 50, at 333;
Lemley, supra note 50, at 997, 1005-28.
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the way individuals listen to music on a CD by repeating certain tracks
and skipping others, or how others view scenes of a movie repeatedly
on video or DVD.
This freedom, this ability to choose when and how to access a
work, is an often unrecognized part of how individuals interact with
copyrighted works." Individuals process information in different
ways. Sometimes, information needs to be processed repeatedly be-
fore it can be fully understood or appreciated. Each encounter with a
creative work may give rise to a new inspiration, impression, or con-
clusion. Thus, repeated access and some degree of freedom in inter-
acting with a copyrighted work can lead to a richer and more complex
appreciation of the work.
This autonomy in consumption may also involve, at times, some
degree of copying. For example, consider note-taking, i.e., reading an
article and copying quotes or making notes about the contents of that
article. In some cases, this copying may be essential to permitting full
consumption of the copyrighted work. Or consider the process of
photocopying journal articles and marking them up. Even if the per-
son making the photocopy owns the original and could mark it up, a
photocopy may in fact be a more useful format. for consumption of
the article." All of these are everyday and rather mundane examples
of the consumer interest in autonomy."
This interest in autonomy is handled pretty well by the existing
practice of selling physical copies of copyrighted works." That is, the
sale of books, CDs, and videotapes has traditionally delivered copy-
52 Cf. Benkler, supra note 19, at 41-50 (analyzing a different kind of autonomy inter-
est); Tussey, supra note 9, at 1134-38.
53 See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 60 F.3d 913,918-19 (2d Gin 1995) (consider-
ing argument that photocopying an article from a journal to store it in office files may be
preferable to visiting the library to reference it).
54 To some extent, this interest in autonomy is an interest that consumers of non-
copyrighted goods share. That is. consumers have a similar interest in autonomously con-
suming potato chips, or ill freely using their toaster ovens whenever and however they like.
Yet autonomy in the consumption of copyrighted works raises additional complications
because of dte malleable nature of copyrighted works. As discussed below, because copy-
righted works are more malleable. consumers Can do far more with copyrighted works
(i.e., copy them) than they can with physital consumer goods. At the same time, and for
much the sante reason, copyright owners have a greater interest in seeking to control such
uses of copyrighted works, whereas they might not be so concerned about controlling uses
of other consumer goods. Thus, these interests come into greater conflict in the context of
copyrighted works than for other non-copyrighted goods.
55 Sec Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies: Copyright Law and the Incidents of Copy Owner-
ship, 42 Wm. & MARY L. Rev. 1245,1286-96 (2001) (discussing permissible uses of a physi-
cal copy of a copyrighted work).
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righted works to consumers in a form that permits a good deal of
autonomy in consumption . 56 The Copyright Act itself expressly rec-
ognizes the distinction between ownership of the copyright and own-
ership of a specific copy. 57
 Individuals who own copies thus have a
good degree of freedom and autonomy in choosing precisely when
and how to consume the work. 58
 Indeed, in paying for the copy, con-
sumers are of course also paying for these additional rights. Thus, the
sale of a copy represents a fixed bundle of entitlements giving the
purchaser the ability to exercise a good deal of autonomy in con-
sumption. 59
In contrast, other methods of delivery do not afford as much
autonomy in consumption. Public performances and television and
radio broadcasts, for example, give consumers less freedom to control
when and how they consume particular works. Yet even here, Con-
gress and the courts have recognized an interest in autonomy by per-
mitting consumers to copy such broadcasts under certain condi-
tions." For example, the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Sony v.
Universal City Studios can be read as implicitly recognizing an interest
in consumer autonomy.fil In that case, the Court held that time-
shifting of television broadcasts, i.e., recording such broadcasts on
VCRs for later viewing, constituted fair use. 62 In addition to consider-
ing the traditional fair use factors (such as the noncommercial nature
of the copying and the lack of impact on the market), the language
employed by the Court seemed to recognize implicitly a consumer
interest in dictating when and where to view that particular work and,
correspondingly, a limit on the ability of the copyright owner to dic-
tate the circumstances of such consumption.°
Similarly, copyright law permits copying in other areas, providing
consumers with some degree of autonomy in consumption. The
Audio Home Recording Act ("AHRA"), for example, gives consumers
broad rights to copy recorded music for personal, noncommercial
use." The AHRA permits consumers to make tapes of music for the
56 Ste id.
57
 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2000) ("Ownership of a copyright ... is distinct from ownership of
any material object in which the work is embodied.").
se SeeLiu, supra note 55, at 1285-96.
" Sec. e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 107 (fai• use); Liu, supra note 55, at 1286-96.
55 See Audio Home Recording Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010; Sony, 464 U.S. at 443-47.
61 See 464 U.S. at 443-47.
65
 Id. at 456.
See id. at 443-47.
64 17
	 §§ 1001-1010.
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car stereo or to make mix tapes that combine different songs. 65 More
broadly, the fair use doctrine ensures that individuals have some free-
dom to copy works for personal purposes, so long as the impact of
that copying on copyright markets is not too significant. 66 Thus, the
type of photocopying of articles mentioned above, for purely personal
purposes, would almost certainly constitute fair use. 67 Together, these
doctrines ensure that consumers will have some degree of autonomy
in their consumption of copyrighted works.
Advances in technology, however, are testing this existing recog-
nition of the consumer interest in autonomy. Digital technology
makes it ever easier for individuals to copy works and consume them
autonomously. Text becomes easier to cut. and paste; music, once in
digital form, becomes easier to move around (from computer to MY3
player to burned CD), combine with other tracks, and even alter.
Similarly, movies and images become easier to manipulate for per-
sonal consumption. For example, technologies like ReplayTV give
consumers ever more control over when and how to view broadcast.
television.68 To take a more sophisticated example, consumers can
even alter software to customize it to fit their own purposes. 09
At the same time, digital technology potentially gives copyright.
owners greater ability to control how consumers interact with their
copyrighted works. In response to the concern that digital technology
now makes copying and distribution of copyrighted works much eas-
ier, copyright owners are increasingly using technology to limit.
significantly the uses in which consumers can engage, so that every
use is metered and charged. 7° By carefully restricting and charging for
uses, owners can both reduce the incidence of piracy and maximize
66 The statute provides for these permissible uses in exchange for a royalty payment
for blank digital recording media. Id. §§ 1003, 1008.
66 See id. § 107.
67 See id.
65 Current information about the ReplayTV product and service (both sold by
SONICblue, Inc.) is available at http://wmv.sonicblue.com/video/replaytv5000/defattlt .
asp (last visited Mar. 26, 2003).
fig CompareLewis Gatoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965, 969-70 (9th
Cir. 1992) (finding modification of playing characteristics of a video game constituted fair
use), with Midway Mfr. Co. v. Artic WI, 547 F. Stipp. 999, 1011-13 (N.D. Ill. 1982), alp,
704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cit., 1982) (finding a similar video game-enhancing device was likely
copyright infringement).
70 SeeJulie Cohen, Souse Reflections on Copyright Management Systems and Laws Designed to
Protect Them, 12 BERKELEY TECIL W. 161, 161-63 (1997)1 Mark Stefik, Shifting the Possible:
How Trusted Systems and Digital Property Rights Challenge Us to Rethink Digital Publishing, 12
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 137, 155-57 (1997).
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their overall returns through price discrimination.n Thus, digital
technology expands consumers' ability to engage in autonomous con-
sumption, while at the same time providing a mechanism for greatly
reducing this type of consumption.
Courts have already begun grappling with cases in which digital
technology is affecting this interest in autonomous consumption. 72
Consider the following two cases involving MP3 music files. In Record-
ing Industry Ass'n of America v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit refused to enjoin the sale and
distribution of a portable MP3 player, which permitted consumers to
"rip" songs from CDs and import them into an easy-to-carry format. 73
Lt UMG Recordings v. MP3.com, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York enjoined an online service that permit-
ted consumers virtually to upload their CDs onto a website and then
access these songs at any location, via the web. 74 Each of these cases
involved specific doctrinal arguments, and there are many grounds
for distinguishing the two results. 75 But they also can be analyzed
through the lens of consumer autonomy. On the one hand, Diamond
Multimedia gives greater recognition to consumer autonomy, while on
the other hand, MP3, com gives comparatively less recognition to this
interest. 76
 Again, the different results may well be justified by doctrine
or by differences in incentive effects, but they certainly have different
implications for this interest in consumer autonomy.
Similarly, new technologies involving digital video recording de-
vices also implicate this consumer interest in autonomy. These de-
vices, such as TiVo and ReplayTV, permit consumers to exercise a
significant amount of control over when and how they view broadcast
71 See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2(1 511, 518-19 (9th Cir. 1993); see
also Liu, supra note 55, at 1341-43 (analyzing the effect of charging for or restricting access
to digital works); R. Anthony Reese, The Public Display Right: The Copyright Act's Neglected
Solution to the Controversy over RAM "Copies', 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 83, 116 (discussing the
importance of the display right to owners trying to license works online).
72 See Lewis Galoob Toys, 964 F.2d at 970-72. See generally Pamela Samuelson, Fair Use for
Computer Programs and Other Copyrightable ItOrics in Digital Form: The Implications of Sony. Ga-
boob and Sega, 1 J. lisiTELL. PROP. L. 49, 73-86 (1993) (considering the implications of
various cases for software copyright disputes); Pamela Samuelson, Modibing Copyrighted
Software: Adjusting Copyright Doctrine to Accommodate a Technology, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 179, 204-
21 (1988) (concluding that social costs of preventing software modification may be too
high).
73 180 F.3d 1072, 1073-74,1081 (9th Cir. 1999).
74
 92 F. Stipp. 2d 349, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
75 See Diamond Multimedia. 180 F.3d at 1075; MP3.corn, 92 F. Stipp. 2d at 351.
78 See Diamond Multimedia, 180 F.3d at 1080-81; M.P3.com, 92 F. Stipp. 2d at 352-53.
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television. 77 Consumers can record shows automatically and then fast-
forward over, or even automatically delete, commercials. Sonic of
these devices also permit, or have been modified to permit, some abil-
ity to transfer video files to other devices. Broadcast owners object to
both of these uses, and at least one lawsuit has been filed against a
manufacturer of these devices. 78 The case directly implicates this in-
terest in consumer autonomy in consumption. 79 In deciding the case
and assessing the fair use claim, the court will have to decide to what
extent consumers can freely consume television broadcasts at the time
and in the manner they like, and to what extent copyright owners can
keep consumers from engaging in this kind of consumption. 80
2. Communication and Sharing
Consumers also have an interest in communicating with others
regarding copyrighted works. Consider, for example, discussions at
work about last night's episode of Friends, or the recent Harry Potter
movie. One might recount certain scenes, debate the significance of
certain actions, or argue over the quality of the work. Or consider
how one might invite some friends over to watch a movie, or might
sing songs around a campfire. Perhaps more formally, consider the
way in which discussion of a book—whether in a class, a book club, or
informally among friends—helps the reader make sense of it.
Such communication may sometimes involve an element of shar-
ing. For example, one may clip out an article to send to a friend,
" Current information about the TiVo product and service (both sold by Taro. Inc.) is
available at littp://www.tivo,com (last visited Mar. 26, 2003). For current information
about ReplayTV, see supra note 68.
711 Sec Newmark v. Turner Broad. Network, 226 F. Stipp. 2d 1215, 1217-18 (C.D. Cal.
2002) (denying defendant ReplayTV's motion to dismiss, and consolidating cases of New-
mark v. Turner Broad. Sys., No. CV 02-04445 FMC (Ex) (ReplayTV users' declaratory
judgment action), and Paramount Pictures Corp. v. ReplayTV, No. CV 01-9358 FMC (Ex)
(suit against ReplayTV for contributory and vicarious copyright infringethent)); see also
Brief of Amici Curiae Center For Internet & Society at 17-30, Paramount Pictures Corp. v.
ReplayTV, CV 01-9358 FMC (Ex) (C.D. Cal. 2002); Staci D. Kramer, Content's King. CABLE-
WORLD, Apr. 29, 2002, available at 2002 WL 9607304 (interview with Jamie Kellner, CEO,
Tu rner Broadcasting System, Inc.).
79 See Newmark 226 F. Stipp. 2d at 1218.
80 Sec Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive Co. v. Gator Corp., No. 020 7909, 2002
WL 31319973 (Sept. 17, 2002) (news reports of the "Gator cases" are plentiful; see, for
example, Lee Gomes, BOOMT0Ii7V: In Attaching 'Parasite,' Publishers' Lawsuit May Hurt Your
Rights, WALL ST. J., July 15, 2002, at B1); see also Drew Clark, Bowdlerizing for Columbine?,
SLATE, Jan. 20, 2003, at http://slate.insn.com/id/2077192 (describing movie studio law-
suit against company distributing software that permits consumers to omit objectionable
scenes in DVDs).
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along with comments. Perhaps one might share a copy of a particu-
larly good CD with friends, or make a tape of the CD for personal use.
Or, one might lend a book to a friend. These activities have, within
them, a communicative component, because they involve collective
consumption of the information embodied in a work.
Copyrighted works are thus not only individual consumer goods,
but also social goods, consumed in a social manner. That is, to make
sense of and interpret many copyrighted works meaningfully, it is
sometimes necessary to communicate with others about the works; to
share viewpoints, to debate, and to argue. Although some works can
certainly be consumed alone, by an individual consumer, many works
are suited to social consumption. The ability to communicate about.
copyrighted works enriches our understanding of those works and
enables us to get much more out of them.
Both the existing technology and law provide extensive opportu-
nities for this kind of communicative consumption.8 i Certainly, noth-
ing in copyright law prevents the communication, discussion, and
sharing of ideas found in copyrighted works.82 And even if such activi-
ties somehow violated an exclusive right, fair use would privilege
many of them.° Similarly, the first sale doctrine permits widespread
sharing of specific copies of works by allowing for the lending and
borrowing of books, CDs, and movies.84 Finally, the limitation of per-
formance rights to public performances also permits a good deal of
collective consumption. 85
 Thus, music and movies can be listened to
or viewed collectively, by groups of social acquaintances, without run-
ning afoul of the copyright laws. 88
 All of these limitations on copyright
owners' rights permit a good deal of sharing, communication, and
social consumption of copyrighted works.
At the same time, copyright law places limits on sharing when the
sharing is less communicative in nature and begins to harm incen-
tives. The first sale doctrine is thus limited in the case of recorded
music and computer software, out of concerns with piracy. 87 Similarly,
shared performances of works are not privileged when the circle of
81 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. gg 107, 109(a) (2000).
82 See id. § 107 (deeming use of copyrighted works non-infringing if "for purposes such
as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, ... scholarship, or research").
as See id.
84
 See id. § 109(a).
88 Id. § 101 (definition of "publicly").
88 Sce 17 U.S.C.§ 101.
87 See id. § 109(b)(1)(A).
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those exposed to the work exceeds a normal group of social acquain-
tances.88 Furthermore, copying and distribution of works is certainly
limited when they have a larger impact on copyright incentives. 88 Ex-
isting doctrines thus accommodate these competing interests, permit-
ting a good amount of communicative consumption while restricting
such consumption when it poses a harm to copyright incentives."
Yet here, too, digital technology is changing both the opportuni-
ties for, and costs of, engaging in this kind of communicative con-
sumption.81 First, technology facilitates new kinds of communicative
consumption by lowering the costs of communication." Now, inter-
pretive communities are not limited by geography, but can include
participants that are separated by vast distances and are united by lit-
tle more titan a common interest in a particular author, movie, or
musical group." Web pages, online discussion forums, newsgroups,
and other technologies all increase the ability of individuals to engage
in social consumption (such as discussion and sharing) of copyrighted
works.84 The ability to engage in this kind of consumption is now
greatly enhanced. 95
At the same time, technology also increases the potential impact.
of this type of communicative consumption on copyright incentives. 96
Although sharing copies with a limited circle of close acquaintances
may once have served this social function without unduly harming
copyright incentives, sharing copies with strangers, or even a wider
circle of online acquaintances, now potentially has a much larger im-
pact on incentives." Similarly, performance or display of a work to a
limited circle of acquaintances may have, in the past, permitted an
accommodation of such interests. 98 But similar performance or dis-
play on the Internet, even on a personal homepage, begins to pose a
88 Sec id. § 101 (definition of "publicly").
89 Sec id. § 107 (explaining that fair use should be evaluated in light of the effect of
the use upon the potential market for, or value of, the copyrighted work.").
99 See id. §§ 107, 109.
91 See Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Law and Social Dialogue on the Information Superhigh-
way: The Case Against Copyright Liability of Bulletin Board Operators, 13 CARDOZO Ants & ENT,
U. 345, 346-50 (1995).
92 See id.
93 See id. at 346 n.1 (citing hillEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES WITHOUT BOUNDA-
RIES, ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN A GLORAL AGE (1990)).
94 See id.
(6 Sec id. at 346-50.
96 See Elkin-Koren, supra note 91, at 349.
Sec id.
98 Sec id.
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more significant threat to copyright incentives because it is accessible
by anyone around the world.
To take an example, consider Los Angeles Times v. Free Republic, in
which a number of newspapers sued a website that permitted mem-
bers to post articles from these newspapers and then comment criti-
cally upon them, looking in particular for evidence of journalistic
bias.99
 Here, the new medium offered expanded possibilities for en-
gaging in communal consumption of a copyrighted work, along with
active discussion of that work. 199
 It enabled conlact among a wider
array of individuals and greatly increased the ability of these individu-
als to critique and discuss a set of copyrighted works. 191 At the same
time, Free Republic illustrates the potential increased costs of such
modes of constimption. 192
 In particular, the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California found no fair use, because the replica-
tion of an entire article on the website had the potential of reducing
demand for the original article. 199 Thus, sharing poses the potential of
greater harm to incentives than exists in the non-digital world.'"
Furthermore, consider the case of file-sharing services like Nap-
ster, 105 Morpheus, 106
 or Kazaa.m Much focus has been given to the
ways in which such file-sharing services facilitate copyright infringe-
ment. IN
 Yet at the same time, there is an element of this activity that is
social—namely the sharing of common interests and information
concerning copyrighted music. It may well be that this interest is
rather minimal and vastly outweighed by the costs associated with
permitting this kind of sharing. But even here, there is a sense that
consumers are using copyrighted works in a certain social context.
99
 L.A. Times v. Free Republic, No. CV 98-7840 MMM, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5669, at
*4, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1453 (C.D. Cal. 2000), final judgment entered at 2000 U.S. Dist.





" See id. at *71-75.
144 See Free Republic, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5669, at *71-75.
10 See MAI Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014-17 (9th Cir. 2001).
1" Morpheus is a service of Streamcast Networks, Inc., Kazaa is a service of Kazaa BV,
and both are currently embroiled in copyright litigation. See generally Nletro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., No. CV-01-8541, 2003 WL 186657 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 9,
2003) (denying Kazaa and Streamcast Networks' motion to dismiss copyright infringement
suit brought by movie studios).
107 See id.
ma Indeed, I have little doubt that they primarily serve exactly this purpose. Sec A4foill
Records, 239 F.3d at 1010-11; Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 2003 1)1, 186657, at *1.
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Thus, any balancing of harms analysis should at least acknowledge the
potential costs to this interest in communicative consumption.
3. Creative Self-Expression
Finally, consumers also have an interest in using copyrighted
works to engage in their own creative self-expression. 109 Here, I am
referring to uses of works that fall short of authorship in the conven-
tional sense, insofar as these uses primarily involve copying that is only
minimally transformative. Thus, they do not involve the significant,
independent creative input that we ordinarily think of when we think
of authorship. Nevertheless, these forms of "mini-authorship" may at
the same time contain a good deal of creative expression. Under this
category of mini-authorship, consumers copy and adapt copyrighted
works in small ways, in the course of making sense of the works, com-
menting on such works, associating themselves with such works, and
communicating additional ideas. 110
One example of this kind of self-expression might be making a
mix tape or CD of songs from different albums. Although the basic
building blocks are literally copied, there is some creative expression
involved in the selection and ordering of these building blocks, and
there may well be a communicative idea that is capable of expression
only through these building blocks. Or, consider a child drawing a
picture of Superman battling Batman. 1 t 1 Again, the copying is literal
and the amount of transformation minimal, yet the act evinces some
'" Sec Rosemary Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual Property
Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEA. L. REV. 1853,1863-68 (1991) (arguing that intellec-
mal property laws may stifle the optimal cultural conditions for dialogic practice); Ro-
chelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation,
65 NOIRE DAnt•, L. 397,405-07 (1990) (suggesting that a shift to more stringent intel-
lectual property laws implicates free speech interests); cf. Wendy Gordon, A Property Right
in Self Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102
YALE L.J. 1533,1556-58,1606-09 (1993) (suggesting that the Lockean model of property
rights does not justify today's system of excessive intellectual property rights).
It See Dreyfuss, supra note 109, at 397-98.
111 See Lange, supra note 4.
What 1 really have in mind is our innate emotional hunger for creative play,
and our considerable incapacity to resist indulging it. The child playing in the
sand on the beach builds castles, which no one but a monster would imagine
forbidding a second child to imitate at will. Creative play in childhood be-
comes the adult fantasy that we recognize in authorship, and it is no less
monstrous to limit authorship among adults than it is among children.
Id. at 146. But see. MuKING Gumfrr, supra note 30, at 203-07 (suggesting that schools (each
students about copyright infringement).
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element of the consumer's own creative self-expression, even if we do
not conventionally think of this as sufficient to constitute "author-
ship.”112 Or consider, finally, an individual performance of a piece of
music on the piano or guitar. Although the individual is performing
the creative work of the original author, there may be significant
amounts of self-expression in the interpretation and performance of
that work. In all of these cases, consumers use copyrighted works as
vehicles or platforms for their own self-expression.
Of course, to some extent, this dichotomy between mini-
authorship and macro-authorship (that is, authorship in the conven-
tional sense) is artificial, as a spectrum exists between these two cate-
gories. Different types of uses can involve varying degrees of trans-
formation, and there may be many fuzzy cases in between."3
Consider, for example, fan fiction, which builds heavily on existing
works, but nevertheless can embody significant creative contribu-
tions. 114 Whether this is macro-authorship or mini-authorship may be
difficult to determine. Even at the minimally-creative end of the spec-
trum, however, there is some level of creative activity being engaged
in, and this activity might be another important component of what it
means to consume a creative work fully. 115 Accordingly, this activity
should be considered in its own right, rather than as an inferior spe-
cies of authorship. 1 6
Although there is a temptation to consider these types of uses as
rather unsophisticated, or "low" forms of authorship, I think that this
is a mistake. True, we may place a premium on the ability of an author
to contribute a significant amount of his or her own creative thought
in building upon past works, and therefore privilege certain author-
ship claims. This should not lead us, however, to underestimate the
value that consumers can derive from adapting works in less trans-
formative ways to express themsehres." 7 Although we might prefer it if
112 See Lange, supra note 4, at 146.
113 See Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law, 17
Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 651,655 (1997); Tussey, supra note 9, at 1139-40.
'" Tushnet, supra note 113, at 655; Tussey, supra note 9, at 1139-10 (referring to fan
sites).
"5 See Lange, supra note 4, at 141-13. In this sense, copyrighted works are even less
analogous to other consumer commodities. We do not frequently attempt to modify or
adapt a toaster oven, soft drink, or other consumer good. In contrast, we frequently do
more with copyrighted works.
116 see. e.g., Tushnet, supra note 113, at 654 (arguing that noncommercial fan fiction
should be protected by law).
117 See Coombe, supra note 109, at 1863-68; Dreyfuss, supra note 109, at 405-07; David
Lange & Jennifer Lange Anderson, Copyright, Fair Use and Transformative Critical Ap-
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consumers always skillfully expressed themselves in their own creative
terms, sometimes individual creative ability falls short of expressive
desire. Copyrighted works can tints serve an important role in ena-
bling individuals to express themselves.
Moreover, there may be much independent value in permitting
this type of creative appropriation, insofar as consumers collectively
may be able to generate unexpected and provocative perspectives on
existing copyrighted works. 119 The value here is not in centralizing
and coordinating the careful development of a cultural property. 119
Rather, the value is in the whimsical and unexpected juxtapositions
that can arise when consumers begin to take and adapt existing copy-
righted works for their own expressive purposes.' 2° Copyrighted works
can thus be the raw building blocks, a platform, for consumer creativ-
ity and self-expression. 121 Moreover, this distributed self-expression
can lead to greater variety of viewpoints. 122
Copyright law currently handles these forms of mini-authorship
in two ways. First, current law contains the doctrine of fair use. 125
Thus, in many cases, individual modifications of works in these mod-
est ways will likely constitute fair use, even if communicated to others,
particularly if the use is noncommercial and poses no harm to the
market."' Second, much of this activity is tacitly permitted through
lack of enforcement. Because much of this activity is difficult to de-
tect, and because the costs of enforcement likely outweigh any eco-
nomic harm, such cases will rarely if ever be prosecuted or even the
subject of a cease-and-desist letter. 125 Thus, in practice, a good deal of
propriation, at littp://www.la•.dtike.edu/pd/papers/langeand.pdf (last visited Apr. 3,
2003): ef. Gordon, mina note 109, at 1556-58. But see Hughes, supra note 29, at 940-42
(pointing out that non-owners of a cultural object have an interest in that object maintain-
ing a stable, commonly understood set of meanings).
1113 See Julie Cohen. Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAN D. L. REv. 1799, 1816-19
(2000).
tit See Yocitai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002).
128 See Cohen, supra note 118, at 1816-19; see also Pete Rojas, Bootleg Culture, SA-
LON.COM , Aug. 1, 2002, at littp://salon.comitech/feature/2002/08/01/bootlegs/print.
html; John Woods, Showing Barbie's Head on Sex Web Site Found to be Fair Use, N.Y. Lj., Nov. 6,
2002, at 1, available at littp;//www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1036542840163.
121 Lange, supra note 4, at 142-43, 146-47.
122 See Cohen, supra note 118, at 1816-19.
123 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
124 See id.
123 But see ER Success, Ltd. v. Binney & Smith, Inc.. 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1380, 1380-
82 (S.D.N.Y, 1997); Girl Scouts v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g Group, Inc., 808 F. Stipp.
1112, 1114-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
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freedom exists to engage in some degree of self-expression using
copyrighted works. 126
Digital technology is, once again, changing the nature of this in-
terest. Indeed, perhaps the most dramatic change is the ease with
which consumers can now access and use copyrighted works for their
own self-expression. Mix tapes are much easier to make when the nut-
sic is in digital form. Similarly, image, text, movie, and sound files are
much easier to alter, transform, and incorporate into other works. 127
Creating a website is as easy as taking components found elsewhere
and copying them onto a personal server. Moreover, as some studies
have shown, a significant proportion of personal web pages contain
material derived from other sites. 128
 This kind of adaptation and use
of preexisting materials is much more costly and difficult in a non-
digital world. Digital technology thus greatly lowers the cost of engag-
ing in this kind of mini-authorship and increases the potential for in-
dividuals to engage in this form of self-expression.
In many cases, copyright owners have recognized the more com-
plex ways in which consumers can now interact with copyrighted
works in digital form, and the ways in which consumers may be able to
contribute to the value of copyrighted works by exercising their own
creative faculties and building upon the original works. Consider, for
example, the very express invitations issued to consumers to craft new
levels for video games 129 or modify such games. 13° Other examples are
massively multi-player online games like Everquest, where much of
the "story" is created by the actions of the participants (and then re-
counted on many other web pages). 131
 In many of these cases, con-
sumers contribute to the value of the game and have a direct impact
128 See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
127 Rojas, supra note 120.
128 See. e.g.. Dale Herbeck & Christopher Hunter, Intellectual Property in Cyberspace: The
Use of Protected Images on the World Wide Web. 15 COMM. RES. REP. 57, 61-62 (1998) (sample
study finding 43.8% of images on student personal websites likely qualified as protected
intellectual property).
129 E.g., DUKE NUKE'EM 3D (3D Realms Entertainment 1996). The game contains a
"Build Editor" allowing players to create.their own levels, which are then frequently posted
on the Internet where others can download them. Micro Star v. Formgen, Inc., 154 F.3d
1107, 1109 (9th Cir. 1998). The manufacturer encourages the practice. Id. For other ex-
amples, see also QUAKE (ID Software, Inc.. originally released 1996); WARCRAFT (Blizzard
Entertainment, Inc., originally released 1994).
' 3° E.g., HALF-Ltrt: (Sierra Entertainment, Inc. 1999). A further example is Day of De-
feat, a World War II modification of Half-Lift.
131 E.g., EVERQUEST (Sony Entertainment, Inc, 1999).
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on its shape. 132 Here, the creative contributions of the consumers are
quite express and play a large role in increasing the value of the crea-
tive work.'"
Some courts have already begun to grapple with evaluating the
contributions of copyright consumers in the digital context. 13" For
example, in a number of cases, courts have analyzed the copyright
interests of consumers who build so-called game levels for computer
games.'" In Micro Star v. Formgen, for example, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit analyzed how game levels created by indi-
vidual consumers created derivative works that were ultimately owned
by the copyright owner of the computer software. 1 " Or, to take an-
other example, in Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc.,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit dealt with the invest,
ment that consumers had made by creating macros for making the
Lotus spreadsheet work. 137 This consumer creativity, on top of a copy-
righted platform, was a consideration that informed the court's deci-
sion. 138 Thus, there has been some recognition of this interest and the
greater ability of individuals to engage in this form of interactive crea-
tivity.
At the same time, digital technology also raises the potential for
constraining this kind of mini-authorship through technical meas-
ures. For example, the major record labels have begun to encrypt.
their music139 in an attempt to prevent constuners from making cop-
"2 See, e.g., Press Release, LucasArts Entertainment Co., New Web Site for Posting of
LucasArts Inspired Game Mods Launched by LFNetwork.com  Fan Site (Dec. 11, 2002),
available at http://www.lucasarts ,com/press/releases/62.html (encouraging game
modifications, or "mods," of its own games).
111
	 e.g., DUKE NUKE'EM, supra note 129; EvEutzuEsT, supra note 131; HALF-LIFE, su-
pra note 130.
134 See, e.g., Micro Star; 154 F.3d at 1107; Lotus Dev. v. Borland Inel, Inc., 49 F.3d 807
(1st Cir. 1995).
1" See. e.g., Micro Star, 1 54 F.3d at 1107; Lotus Dm 49 F.3d at 807.
"6 SCC 154 F.3d at 1109.
"7 49 F.3d at 809-12, 818.
iss Id. at 818-19. Note that in this case, the concern was less about promoting the in-
terests of consumers directly, and more about permitting competitors to enter the market.
See id.
139 E.g., Jon Healey, AM Selling Songs Online in Unprotected Format Music, L.A. Thus,
June 15, 2002, at C2. available at 2002 WI. 2483291 ("Consumers have been cool to the
labels' encrypted songs, preferring digital files that can easily be copied, played on port-
able devices and burned onto CDs."); Steve Morse, Burned? Last Year; Recordable Discs Out-
sold CDs for the First Time. With So Many People Copying Music, Is the Record Industry Toast?,
BosToN (11.otm, Apr. 21, 2002, available at 2002 WL 4123385 (discussing consumers' appe-
tite for exchanging digital music and the music industry's response to digital copying
technology).
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ies of such music, i.e., to thwart their attempts to "rip, mix, and
burn."140
 Similarly, copy-protection schemes have been implemented
to control copying of software, DVDs, VHS tapes, and even text." 1 All
of these measures are backed up by the use of technologies such as
encryption and watermarking, along with attendant legal support. 142
In many ways, the effect of these technologies is to eliminate or limit
greatly the potential for consumer transformation and adaptation of
the works.
OBSERVATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
In the discussion above, I have attempted to show the different
ways in which consumer interests are more complex than we ordinar-
ily think. In the following discussion, I outline how this more complex
vision of the copyright consumer might affect how we think about
copyright entitlements, particularly as we move from more fixed
modes of consumption to more flexible, digital forms of consump-
tion. These observations are necessarily tentative, but they may point
the way for future study.
A. Observations
Because much of this discussion is tentative, I will list observa-
tions individually.
I. Copyright law has historically given space for additional consumer
interests, through doctrines such as first sale, fair use, and private
performance.
My first observation is purely descriptive: namely, that copyright
law, prior to the advent of digital technology, had given consumers
140
 Apple Computer. Inc., Apple Computer Advertising Campaign, available at
http://www.apple.com/itunesiburn.html
 (last visited Nov. 18, 2002).
141 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.Sd 429, 436-37 (2d Cir. 2001) (con-
cerning defendant's circumvention of the Content Scramble System, used by the motion
picture studios to encrypt DVD movies); United States v. Elcomsoft, 203 F. Stipp. 2d 1111
(N.D. Cal. 2002) (denying motion to dismiss; case currently pending) (news reports avail-
able at Electronic Frontier Foundation, http://wwweff,org/IP/DMCA/US_v_Elcomsoft/
media.html); Press Release, Adobe Sys.. Inc., Adobe Announces New Pricing and Distribu-
tion for its Digital Rights Management Software ( Jan. 15, 2002). at lutp://wmv.aciobe.
com/aboutatiohe/pressroom/
 pressreleases/200201/20020115con ten tserver. It unl (press
release describing Adobe eBook, a software program that allows books to be bought and
sold online, and read on the computer).
"2 See Digital Millenium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.§§ 1201-1205 (2000).
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some degree of freedom, not only to consume copyrighted works ei-
ther as passive consumers or as active authors, but also to fulfill these
additional interests in autonomy, communication, and self-expression.
That is, pre-digital copyright law and copyright markets did a rea-
sonably good job of satisfying the full range of consumer interests,
while adequately protecting authorial incentives. 143 This point is de-
veloped in more detail in the sections above, so I will not recap that
analysis here. 144
2. The relationship between these consumer interests and copyright
owner interests is becoming more complex with advances in digital
technology.
Much attention has been paid to the problems faced by copyright
owners as digital technology permits nearly zero-cost copying and dis-
tribution of works. 145
 Some attention has also been focused on how
the Internet and digital technology may, at the same time, make it eas-
ier for authors to create and distribute their works. 146 But compara-
tively less attention has been paid to how digital technology affects the
interests of copyright consumers. True, some have argued that digital
technology may make consumer access to works even greater (i.e.,
satisfying the passive consumer interest). 147
 Digital technology, how-
ever, also has the potential to increase the ability of consumers to real-
ize more fully many of the more complex interests set forth in the
framework above. Indeed, there are already many examples in which
consumer relationships to copyrighted works are far more complex
than they have previously been.'" The preexisting balance between
author interests and these more complex interests of the copyright
consumer is being shifted in significant and unpredictable ways." 9
Again, these points have been made in more detail above. 150
141 See supra notes 61-67,82-86,123-126 and accompanying text.
'" See supra notes 61-67,82-86,123-126 and accompanying text.
146 See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 33, at 45; Hardy, supra note 29,1 12; Tussey, supra
note 9, at 1131-33.
146 See, e.g., supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
"7
 See. e.g., Bell, supra note 28, at 558-60,618-19 (arguing for increased regulation of
access to online works).
148 See supra notes 68-69,72-76,91-95,127-138 and accompanying text.
145
 See supra notes 68-69,72-76,91-95,127-138 and accompanying text.
160 See supra notes 68-69,72-76,91-95,127-138 and accompanying text.
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3. These complex consumer interests are important and should be
considered in conjunction with concerns about incentives for
authorship.
If, as I argue above, these more complex consumer interests do
exist, and are becoming increasingly complex as digital technology
evolves, it follows that we need to make a substantive judgment about
these interests. They had some recognition in the pre-digital envi-
ronment; the digital environment is now affecting these interests in
unpredictable ways. If these interests are not significant, then perhaps
we need not worry and should just let the market do what it will. If,
on the other hand, they are significant, then perhaps we need to pay a
hit more attention to how such interests will be looked after in the
digital environment.
As is probably clear from the above discussion, I think these in-
terests in autonomy, communication, and creative self-expression,
though up to now largely overlooked, are quite important. They are
important because they go directly to the ability of consumers to de-
rive meaning from copyrighted works. 151 Although individuals often
interact with copyrighted works in a passive manner, some individuals
also interact with copyrighted works in a more active manner, and this
has an impact on what they take away from the works. 152 Some degree
of freedom and autonomy when interacting with a copyright work is
necessary to obtain full meaning from that work. The law must allow
for freedom to communicate about that work, and even freedom to
manipulate the work.
Perhaps "necessary" is too strong: one could envision quite a use-
ful world in which consumption is purely passive, where copyright
owners have extensive control over how and when individuals con-
sume works, with whom they share those works, and whether they can
alter those works in any fashion. But this world would be far less rich
and interesting than a world in which these activities were permissi-
ble. The latter world would be a lot more fun.'" Indeed, what I have
151 See, e.g., supra note 117 and accompanying text.
155 See supra notes 109-122 and accompanying text.
153 See Lange, supra note 4, at 139 ("1 observe how new technologies, the most
significant among them still essentially beyond imagining as Foucault wrote, are under-
mining the efficacy of intellectual property as 'a constraining figure' in the evolving em-
bodiments of creative play."); see also Margaret Jane Raclin, Property Evolving in Cyberspace, 15
J.L. & COMM. 509, 510-11 (1996); cf. Edward W. Felten, The Fallacy of the Almost-General-
Purpose Computer; Freedom to Tinker, at http://www.freedotn-to-
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in mind here is very much David Lange's idea of readers "at play in
the fields of the word."'" As Lange presciently observed, digital tech-
nology offers precisely this potential. 155 It may be that consumers will
not realize it.-1 certainly do not. want to overstate the desire of con-
sumers to engage more actively with copyrighted works (there is more
than a little couch potato in all of us)—but as long as the potential
exists, it would be a shame to cut it off too soon.
Indeed, I would argue that much of the instinctive resistance that.
consumers have voiced regarding attempts by copyright owners to
control consumption of copyrighted works is not (or at least not. en-
tirely) due to a self-interested, passive-consul -tier concern with getting
free or convenient access to works, Much of the objection can, I think,
be explained as an instinctive resistance to the way in which extensive
copyright-owner control affects what we get out. of, and how we think
about, copyrighted works, In pail, this reaction may be because con-
sumers have always been accustomed to some degree of autonomy in
consumption. But it may also be because they think there is some-
thing essential about this autonomy and freedom when interacting
with copyrighted works.
Of course, these interests need to be balanced against a concern
with copyright incentives, If these activities harm incentives too much,
then we need to make decisions about how much of this activity is
permissible. Copyright. law already does this in the pre-digital con-
text.'" We do not permit consumer interests in autonomy, sharing,
and self-expression to undercut completely the incentives for authors
to create works in the first place.I 57 Moreover, as noted above, I do not
wish either to overstate the value of more active modes of consump-
tion or to understate the value of passive modes of consumption. It
may well be that the vast majority of consumers are perfectly content.
to consume works passively, and privileging the few active consumers
may too-greatly harm the interests of the more passive consumers. If
that is the case, then limits on active consumption may be the price
we have to pay to ensure that the passive consumption interest is satis-
fied.
tiliker.com/archives/2002_10, html (Oct 14, 2002) (making a similar point in the context
of technology),
154 Lange, supra note 4, at 139 (title of article).
155 See id. at 146-17.
156 See supra notes 61-67,82-86,123-126 and accompanying text.
157 See St1P117 notes 61-67,82-86,123-126 and accompanying text,
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My point is simply that copyright law should at least recognize
these more complex consumer interests and consider them in con-
junction with the underlying concern about incentives. It would be a
serious mistake, in other words, to focus exclusively on the passive
consumer interest and reject more active consumer claims as merely
unrealistic, self-interested claims for free access. 08
Applying the above framework to a concrete example, we might
well conclude that consumer interests in communication and sharing
may be sufficiently served even in a digital environment of strong
copyright-owner control over access and copying. That is, we might.
conclude that individuals can still communicate freely and exchange
ideas about the merit and meaning of copyrighted works. The Inter-
net, by reducing costs of communication, has greatly expanded the
opportunities for such communication from the pre-digital baseline.
And the ability easily to link to and find copyrighted content may
serve as a good substitute for the sharing of physical copies. Indeed, it
may be quite superior to costly physical sharing. At the same time,
permitting direct sharing of digital copies may present such a threat
to copyright incentives that it outweighs the minimal additional .
communicative impact of permitting such sharing. 159 Thus, in the
end, consideration of these more complex consumer interests in
communication and sharing may still result in a conclusion that privi-
leges copyright owner control, at least in this specific context. The
point, however, is simply that, in making this judgment, we need at
least to consider the social aspects of information sharing in setting
copyright entitlements.
4. The market may evolve to satisfy some of these consumer interests.
Of course, to say that these more complex consumer interests are
important is not to say that anything needs to be done to preserve
them. It may well be, as some have suggested, that if we give broad
entitlements to copyright owners, the market will eventually fulfill
these consumer interests.m° After all, if consumers derive an addi-
tional benefit from a certain amount of autonomy', sharing, or self-
156 But scc Ginsburg, supra note 33, at 45.
ISO There may be other, non-constuner-related reasons to support continued sharing of
copyrighted works. See, e.g., Reese, supra note 71, at 116.
160 See. e.g.. Bell, supra note 28, at 585-90. For a more complete discussion of the ar-
guments behind copyright entitlements and market responses, see Liu, supra note 55, at
1314-24.
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expression, they should be willing to pay for it. 161 Similarly, copyright.
owners will have incentives to satisfy these interests, provided that. the
technology permits them to do so and underlying concerns about pi-
racy are satisfied. 162
There may well be reasons to be hopeful on this score, particu-
larly with respect to the consumer interest in autonomy. Consumers
have, in the past, rejected some forms of control that they find too
intrusive. The early experience with software copy protection is illus-
trative. Consumers rejected it because it made software less useful. 163
The failure, thus far, of pay-per-view methods of movie delivery may
have similar causes. Today, the record industry may be facing much
this same issue, as consumers reject modes of paying for music that,
too-greatly restrict their ability to make music portable, to keep it., and
to share 4. 164 Indeed, in response to this, record companies have al-
ready begun experimenting with methods of pricing that enable a
good degree of autonomy in consumption, as well as some sharing. 166
As markets settle down, as technology becomes a bit. more stable,
and as pricing and delivery structures emerge, many of these more
complex consumer interests may well be satisfied. Individuals may still
be able to do quite a bit with the works that they have access to, that
is, consume them in autonomous ways, share them in certain ways,
and build off of them in certain ways. Because the markets and tech-
nology are so nascent, it may well be premature to conclude that.
these interests are being harmed, or that their potential will not be
adequately fulfilled in the digital environment.
5. Policymakers should be vigilant to ensure that these interests are
recognized.
At the same time, there is no guarantee that the market will
achieve the balance that we think is optimal. Indeed, the existence of
various doctrines—like fair use in the physical world—indicates that
161 See, e.g., Bell, supra note 28, at 585-90; Liu, supra note 55, at 1314-24.
le See, e.g., Bell, supra note 28, at 585-90; Liu, supra note 55, at 1314-24.
163 E.g., Dawn C. Chmielewski. Exec: Copy Guards Doomed, Buyers' Needs Not Met, Says An-
dreesen, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEws, Apr. 10,2002, at 1C (reporting Netscape founder Marc
Andreessen's view that consumer demand may doom future efforts to provide for copy
protection, just as past efforts to protect software failed).
164 Part of this, however, may be due to the easy alternative of free music via file shar-
ing systems. See, e.g., ABM Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004,1014-17 (9th Cir. 2001).
1 °6 cf. Ginsburg, supra note 33, at 45 (suggesting that copyright owners use the DMCA
and copyright caselaw to promote the broad distribution of works at reasonable prices).
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the law does not generally rely entirely upon the market to satisfy
these more complex consumer interests.'" Instead, the law sets enti-
tlements to give recognition to these interests, to provide breathing
space for others to interact with copyrighted works. 167
Although the market may satisfy some of these interests, it may be
that the market will not satisfy all of these interests. The technology
may not develop, for example, to permit the type of control that
copyright owners would want before permitting autonomy or sharing.
Transaction costs may stand in the way of these interests.'" Pricing
and bundling strategies may maximize copyright-owner returns, but at
the expense of flexibility on the consumer side. 169 Finally, lack of in-
formation, fear of uncertainty, path-dependence, and bureaucratic
conservatism may limit the degree to which corporations permit this
kind of freer access, even if in their own self-interest. 17°
Moreover, even if some licensing schemes do emerge to address
most consumer interests in autonomy and consumption, these licens-
ing schemes may not provide as much freedom as we would like, In-
deed, it would be hard for companies to predict and cost-effectively to
provide licenses for all of the different ways in which consumers de-
cide to interact with copyrighted works, given how increasingly com-
plex such interactions will likely be. Even if licenses are low-cost, the
very need to seek out a license may hinder an individual's ability to
derive the full value from the copyrighted work. Much value, in fact,
can come from the spontaneous and unpredictable nature of one's
reaction to a copyrighted work.ra
I do not think we yet have the information to determine whether
markets will provide sufficient recognition of these more complex
consumer interests. Thus, it may be wise to wait and see how the mar-
kets develop before intervening. We need at least to be attuned, how-
ever, to the possibility that the market may not provide sufficient rec-
ognition of these interests. In particular, if we give copyright owners
ever greater control over consumer uses of works, and if markets do
not develop to provide opportunities for the kind of autonomy, shar-
166 See 17 U S.C.§ 107 (2000).
167 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
ma Sec, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J.
283, 309-24, 332-34 (1996) (describing the neoclassicist approach to markets and copy-
rights and possible problems with market approaches).
169 Sce id. at 333-34.
' 7° Sec id.
171 Cohen, supra note 118, at 1816-19.
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ing, and self-expression that I have described above, then the result-
ing costs will be significant.
Even without solid information, there may be good reason to ex-
pect the market to be particularly ill-suited to recognizing the con-
sumer interest in self-expression. Under a technology-backed licens-
ing system, copyright owners will be able to choose which messages
consumers can express, using their works as platforms." 2 That is, they
may permit. certain consumers to access unencrypted files to express
certain messages, while holding back access to those who would ex-
press other, perhaps unfavorable messages. 175 Moreover, this activity
may be perfectly rational, insofar as it preserves the value of the copy-
righted work and protects it from exposure to contrary viewpoints. 174
From a social point of view, however, this type of control would elimi-
nate much of the diversity and value of consumer self-expression. 175
True, individuals might still be able to engage in some degree of
creative appropriation, just without the ease associated with digital
technology. For example, a consumer may be able to make an analog
copy of an encrypted sound file or video clip. If creative self-
expression is an interest we value, however, then it is hard to see why
consumers should be automatically excluded from some of the advan-
tages of the new technology. 176 Indeed, as pointed out above, one of
the great benefits of digital technology is that it holds the potential
for permitting consumers to express themselves much more fully and
more easil): 177 Without some recognition of such an interest, the mar-
ket may not permit enough room for individuals to use copyrighted
works to engage in self-expression.
B. Legal Responses
How, then, should the law respond to the observations above? My
conclusions here are tentative, but they suggest first that policymakers
should be attuned to these more complex consumer interests and not
be too quick to conclude that all consumer interests are satisfied once
172 Cf. Robert Merges, Are You Making Fig n of Met Notes on Mathd Frahm and the Aanirly
Defense in Copyright, 21 Am. lwrEt.i. PROP. L. Ass's Q.J. 305, 308-09 (1993) (discussing
market failure when copyright owners flatly refused to license song for purposes of rap
parody).
1 " Cf. id.
174 cf. id.
176 Cf. Gordon, 514 pro note 109, at 1556-58, 1606-09.
176 See supra notes 117-122 and accompanying text.
177 See supra notes 117-122 and accompanying text.
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the passive consumer interest is satisfied. In the context of litigation,
this conclusion suggests that courts, in dealing with new technologies,
should acknowledge and give some weight to consumer interests in
autonomy, communication, and self-expression. For example, in de-
termining whether new kinds of uses (such as those enabled by new
technology like MP3 players, TiVo, ad-stripping software, and web
browsers) constitute fair use, courts should give some weight to these
more complex consumer interests in autonomy, communication, and
self-expression. 1 " It may be that such interests are outweighed by
competing concerns about the impact of such uses on copyright in-
centives. In this Article, I do not take a position on what should result.
from such a weighing. Rather, my point is simply that courts should
not limit their consideration of consumer interests too narrowly. 179
In the context of legislation, the observations above suggest that
members of Congress also need to be conscious that, in their attempts
to bolster copyright law for purposes of reducing infringement, their
activities may have an undesirable impact on these more complicated
consumer interests.m More specifically, the above observations sug-
gest that efforts at this point in time to reinforce, through legal sanc-
tion, the ability of copyright owners to protect their works through
technology may be problematic. The DMCA, for example, is an effort
to give copyright owners an advantage as they begin distributing copy-
righted works in digital form."I It does so by imposing liability for cir-
cumventing encryption and other access-control technologies. 182 It
also imposes liability on the development and distribution of tools
that enable such circumvention." 3 Significantly, the DMCA contains
no broad fair use exception.
The justification for the DMCA has conventionally been that,
without its assurances, copyright owners would be reluctant to make
works available in digital form. 184 Even though copyright owners may
use technology to protect their copyrighted works, such technologies
178 For examples of courts that have, at least implicitly, given some weight to these con-
siderations, see Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Intl, Inc., 49 F.3d 807,818 (1st Cir. 1995), and
Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965,969 (9111 Cir. 1992).
179 Consideration of such interests could also have an impact on other areas of copy-
right law. E.g., MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511,518-19 (9th Cir. 1993).
190 See supra notes 52-54,72-86,110-116 and accompanying text.
181 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (2000).
182 Id. § 1201 (a) (1).
la' Id. § 1201(a) (2), (b).
181 See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
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are easily circumvented. 185 Thus, the DMCA, by both imposing sepa-
rate penalties for circumvention and outlawing circumvention tech-
nology, gives copyright owners a legal leg up in the technological
arms race.'86 In this way, the DMCA serves the core, passive consumer
interest. in ensuring that consumers have available to them works that
they can consume. As others have noted, the factual premises underly-
ing the DMCA (i.e., both the need for, and efficacy of, the DMCA) are
subject. to debate. 137
Yet even if one believes that the DMCA does in fact provide addi-
tional assurances against impermissible copying, it does this at a po-
tential Cost to some of the more complicated consumer interests set
forth in this Article. That is, the DMCA gives added legal support to a
world in which copyrighted works are tightly controlled through the
use of technology. 188 This has the effect of making it far more difficult
for individuals to consume copyrighted works autonomously, to share
copyrighted works, and to incorporate copyrighted works in one's
own self-expression. 189 A consumer will not be able legally to circum-
vent the access-control measure to move a song file to another device,
to share that song file with another individual, or to use a portion of
that. song file on a personal web page.' 9° Even if such uses would con-
stitute fair use, the act of circumventing the access-control technology
would result in liability under the DMCA. 191 Moreover, by banning
technologies that facilitate stick uses, the DMCA ensures that con-
sumers will not have access to any method of engaging in such cir-
cumvention in the first place. 192 Thus, the DMCA holds the potential
of effectively blocking out some of the breathing space that conven-
tional copyright law made available for more active modes of con-
st imption.
It might be that, as supporters of the DMCA argue, this is the
necessary price of fully satisfying passive consumer interests.'" This
claim, however, needs to be examined more carefully, particularly in
If Sec supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
186 Sec supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
187 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, ‘Viitra), Jan. 1996, at 134, 137-38.
188, 190, available at http://wwwwired.com/wired/archive/4.01/wItite.paper_prittlIII.
188 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205.
188 Sec id.
190 Sec id.
191 See id. § 1201 (a) (1).
182 Sec id. § 1201(a) (2), (b).
188 See 17 U .S.C.§ 1201(a) (2), (1)).
194 Sec supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
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light of the costs of such an approach. The aim of this Article has
been to identify' clearly the more complex interests that consumers
have in copyrighted works and to argue that these interests are valu-
able. Accordingly, in deciding whether to give legal support to tech-
nological control over consumer uses, we need to weigh carefully the
purported benefits of such an approach in satisfying more passive
consumer interests against the costs in the form of more limited active
consumer interests. It would be a mistake, in other words, simply to
focus on the former and neglect or fail seriously to consider the latter.
As discussed above, it is possible that, even with strict copyright-
owner control, normal market mechanisms may' provide copyright
consumers with some degree of autonomy and the potential for more
active modes of consumption. 195 There are reasons to believe that
consumers may reject methods of control that too-greatly restrict their
autonomy; and that copyright owners may respond to consumer pref-
erences by permitting some degree of autonomy and sharing. But this
is not a foregone conclusion. Moreover, as already discussed above,
there are reasons to doubt that copyright owners will sufficiently con-
sider consumer interests in self-expression.'" At the very least, these
interests and these doubts suggest that it would be unwise to foreclose
such uses here at the outset. Yet the DMCA appears to do just that, by
creating the potential for stricter limits on the ability of individuals
actively to consume copyrighted works. 197
A more measured approach would at least preserve some ability
for courts to modify the law if it. appears that consumer interests are
being harmed too greatly' and the market is not satisfying such inter-
ests appropriately. 198
 For example, a fair use defense to the DMCA
would permit courts to police the market to ensure that some of these
more complex consumer interests are recognized on a case-by-case
basis.'" Indeed, a number of bills have recently been introduced pro-
195 Sec supra Part I1.A.4.
199 See supra Part
197
 Under this view, proposed measures to require such protection measures to be in-
cluded in consumer hardware are even more problematic. See Consumer Broadband and
Digital Television Promotion Act, S. 2048, 107th Cong. §§ 3, 6 (2002), available at http://
www.politechbot.com/docs/cbdtpa/hollings.s2048.032102.1uml.
tea True, under the DMCA, the Copyright Office can promulgate regulations exempt-
ing categories of works from the strictures of the DMCA. Digital Millennium Copyright
Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (1) (13). The phrasing of the statutory exemption power (limited to
categories of works, as opposed to uses), however, has led the Copyright Office to exempt
only very narrow categories of works. See id.
199 Many other arguments have been advanced in support of such a safety-valve. See,
e.g., Glynn Lumley, The Death of Copyright, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 910 (2001) (arguing that a
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posing to modify the DMCA to provide such breathing space. 24° These
bills and the arguments supporting them, couched in terms of "con-
sumer rights," reflect a growing recognition and appreciation of more
active consumer interests in copyrighted works. Ultimately, as con-
sumers themselves become more involved in the process of setting
copyright entitlements, the political process itself may serve to foster
greater appreciation for more active consumer interests.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have argued that copyright doctrine contains no
developed theory or image of the consumer, and that such an image
could help shed some useful light on the proper scope of copyright
law. In the passages above, I have attempted to begin sketching out at.
least one such image and the implications of such an image. The con-
clusions of this Article, however, are quite tentative, and I do not pur-
port to argue that this image of the consumer is the correct or only
one. The hope is that, by proposing at least one such image, this Arti-
cle will encourage more thought and analysis of copyright law's con-
ception of the consumer.
fair use defense ought to be incorporated into the DMCA, supplemented by weak encryp-
tion, faith in consumers, and possibly a limited tax on copying technology). This Article's
analysis of the consumer interest in copyright law suggests perhaps another reason for
favoring such a result.
200 See Digital Media Consumers' Rights Act of 2002, H.R. 5544, 107th Cong. (2002)
(to amend the Federal Trade Commission Act to provide that the advertising or sale of a
mislabeled copyrighted music disc is all unfair method of competition and an unfair and
deceptive act or practice); Digital Choice and Freedom Act of 2002, H.R. 5522, 107th
Cong. (2002) (to amend Title 17 of the United States Code to safeguard the rights and
expectations of consumers who lawfully obtain digital entertainment). Also consider alter-
natives using compulsory licensing. See, e.g., Lumley, supra note 199, at 845, 851-52, 910
(recognizing the option of compulsory licensing, but ultimately recommending a mixture
of weak encryption and faith in American consumers).
